The aim of this paper is to show how tenderness (attendrissement) plays a key role in Rousseau's theory of emotion. A deeper analysis of tenderness will shed light on the complex dynamics of Rousseau's conception of the passions, which appears to be one of the principal means of understanding both the transition from the homme de la nature to the homme de l'homme and the development of human morality in the latter. Furthermore, the concept of attendrissement allows us to view from an unfamiliar, original standpoint a central problem of Rousseauian ethics, which has been debated, particularly in recent literature, namely that of recognition. Tenderness, thanks to its authentic and spontaneous nature, is able to retain the principles of the law of nature -pity and love of the self -while elevating them to an ethically superior height. For this reason, it might be considered a positive fulfillment of amour-propre capable of eliminating the pathological and competitive aspects that connote, from a historical but not constitutive point of view, the reciprocal interdependence of consciences.
which the question of tenderness appears, make a philosophical analysis of the concept very complicated. What emerges with some clarity from a review of the numerous occurrences of the term is its dual nature. 3 On the one hand -as the passage from the Épitre à Bordes shows -attendrissement is inevitably linked to an interpersonal and social dimension, whereas on the other it aspires to natural innocence, as Julie notes: "This tearful state relieved me somewhat, and I found some consolation in feeling that the sweet movements of nature have not completely died in my heart." 4 The coexistence of these facets, at first glance contradictory, should not be attributed mainly to a change in Rousseau's thinking nor to the undeniable oscillations that characterized it, but rather should be seen as part of the complexity of emotional life and the vital role that this plays both at an anthropological and moral level.
Notwithstanding the fact that the theory of emotions has been strongly debated particularly in recent years, having a notable impact on diverse fields of knowledge, no specific contributions dealing with the concept of attendrissement have been made. 5 Nor has the fact that the historically decisive part played by Rousseau's work in defining the modern concept of emotion is widely recognized, inspired any. 6 When it comes to explaining Rousseau's understanding of the specific role played by emotions when making moral judgements, scholars tend to apply external heuristic formulations (taken mainly from the tradition of the Scottish moral sense theorists) to his ideas, or to make comparisons to other authors (Hume, Diderot, Kant, Wordsworth, etc.) . 7 It is significant, for example, that there have been many contributions dedicated to the idea of "sympathy" in Rousseau 8 -who in fact used the word only eleven times in all his work -and none to tenderness, which he used much more frequently. 9 The only exception, to my knowledge, is a brief passage by Luc Boltanski, which highlights the potential interest of such a study, albeit without then undertaking one:
Rousseau particularly develops the analysis of the gentle, tender and altruistic emotions […] . The emotion in the forefront of Rousseau's interest is therefore tender-heartedness [attendrissement] . Tender-heartedness [that is, tenderness] is the sympathetic emotion par excellence, a "gentle emotion" which tends to be distinguished from the indignation aroused at the sight of injustice, both being different responses to the spectacle of "human miseries". 10 There are two reasons why a detailed examination of Rousseau's idea of attendrissement needs to be made. Firstly, a deeper analysis of tenderness would help to clarify the complex dynamics of Rousseau's conception of the passions. This appears to be one of the principal means for understanding both the transition from the homme de la nature to the homme de l'homme and the development of human morality in the latter. Secondly, the concept of attendrissement allows us to tackle from a novel, innovative perspective a central problem of Rousseauian ethics, debated particularly in recent literature, namely that of the recognition -or, to use terms more faithful to the Genevan's language -the dependency of man on the opinion of others.
11
This essay will attempt to show how the idea of tenderness can aid our understanding of the intricate dynamics of spontaneity, emotion, moral sensitivity, and sociality. Thanks to its authentic and spontaneous nature, tenderness is invested with a decisive moral role, such that it might be considered a positive fulfillment of amour-propre capable of eliminating the pathological and competitive aspects that connote, from a historical but not constitutive point of view, the reciprocal interdependence of consciences. However, first of all, it will be necessary to examine in greater depth Rousseau's account of the genesis of emotion, as well as his theory of the passions, which makes plain the special role assigned to attendrissement.
The ambiguity of emotion
The essential tension inherent in tenderness -represented by the presence in it of a relative (and therefore mediated) nature and an incessant claim of immediacy -in hindsight reflects the duality that, in Rousseau's eyes, characterizes human emotion. The origin of this ambiguity must be sought in the chasm between the homme de la nature and l'homme de l'homme. Emotions, in fact, arise only at the point of exit from the state of nature and entry into civil society, which contemporaneously gives the individual right of access to humanity in the highest (moral and social) sense of the word. This, while clearly being a fact of interiority, an inner agitation that pervades the whole being, is not purely self-referential, since it presupposes the subject's recognition of otherness, which is a prerequisite for the achievement of self-awareness, unavailable to primitive man: "Not only do virtue and morality exist only in society, but they are also, in fact, the recognition of the existence of others."
12 In short, the ability to feel emotion implies a well-advanced development of the dialectic between needs and desires. The domination of the former over the latter (made possible by memory and imagination) at the same time gives rise to the dimensions of passion and rationalism that are intended to reinforce each other:
Whatever the Moralists may say about it, human understanding owes much to the passions, which by common agreement also owe much to it. It is by their activity that our reason is perfected; we seek to know only because we desire to have pleasure.
13
In the hypothetical reconstruction of the history of humanity outlined in the Discours sur l'inégalité, emotion in fact appears only from the beginning of the so-called "epoch of a first revolution." 14 This moment marked the differentiation and foundation of families and, in due time, the birth of "distinct nations," those crude social structures that had a level of cohesion not in laws, but in customs and a shared way of life. The repercussions of such changes on moral grounds were as substantial as they were dissonant: on the one hand, "the habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to men," 15 yet on the other they introduced a clear distinction between being (être) and appearing (paraître), represented by the birth of a social identity constructed through the eyes of others: "Each one began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had value."
16
If emotion is characterized as the actual moment when the individual gains access to morality, its simple unfolding is not by itself sufficient to guarantee goodness. This awareness justifies, on the one hand, the centrality that Rousseau attributed to emotion in the definition of humanity, to the point of not hesitating to describe existence itself in a "sentimental" light. On the other hand, it makes clear his distance from an uncritical "cult" of emotion and from a blind abandonment to a "sentimental onanism" 17 which became, nonetheless, the key feature of a large part of the Romantic tradition that was openly influenced by his thought.
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In light of this brief reconstruction of the birth of emotion, it seems possible to have a better grasp of Rousseau's theory of the passions. Despite the fact that he never attempted a systematic reflection on this subject, it is clear from reading all the works that dealt with it more or less explicitly (as occurs especially in Émile, but also in the Nouvelle Héloïse and the Dialogues) that he was not so much interested in classifying the passions as in giving an account of the dynamics that bound them to other human faculties, from mere sensation to intellectual thought. Rousseau not only rejected the canonical Thomist distinction between the concupiscible passions and the irascible passions but, more importantly, he constructed what might be called a "sociological" theory of the passions. Rousseau in fact completely changes the model constructed by Descartes in the Passions de l'âme. He replaces Descartes's mechanical psychophysiology with a "sociology" of emotions, in which the goodness or evil of any passion depends on the use made of it rather than on its own nature.
19 This transition from a descriptive conception to a normative conception of emotion marks the originality of Rousseau's theory compared to the many seventeenthcentury classifications -such as those proposed not only by Descartes, but also by Thomas Wright, Nicolas Coeffetteau and Jean-François Senault. 20 For Rousseau, to emphasize the social development of the passions does not mean to relegate them to the sphere of mundane appearance, but on the contrary to valorize the crucial role that passions play in human anthropology. This assumption is confirmed by the idea -implicitly present in all Rousseau's work, and explicitly expressed in the Dialogues -that two distinct but interdependent levels compose human sensitivity.
Written in the final years of Rousseau's life, between 1772 and 1776, the Dialogues is a complex and exceptional work with a reflexive, defensive structure. And it is, moreover, convoluted, overlong and repetitive. As a consequence the real philosophical value of the writing has long been overlooked, being recognized only in recent years. 21 Rousseau's strenuous defense of Jean-Jacques to the French -in the past often considered to be the result of a pathological form of psychological disassociation -actually brings a normative status to the autobiographical work. The unfortunate Jean-Jacques, persecuted and rejected from every social order, is for all that the only model on which to build a legitimate human order. He exemplifies a new model of man who can remain faithful to nature even within society. This fact emerges particularly clearly in the long analysis of the sensitivity of "Jean-Jacques" which is at the heart of the second Dialogues.
At the first level, which brackets man with animals, there is in fact "a purely passive physical and organic sensitivity which seems to have as its end only the preservation of our bodies and of our species through the direction of pleasure and pain." 22 In this situation, which to Rousseau's mind was obviously pre-moral (and therefore pre-passional and pre-social), one can only speak inaptly of emotion, indicating by the term the pleasant or painful quality of an action in relation to the two fundamental principles of natural law, namely self-preservation and pity. These two "instinctual" elements maintain the balance between the natural centripetal movements, which tend to relate everything to the subject and its existence, and the equally natural expansive motions, which instead induce him to be open to otherness.
However, beside and beyond this level, which in hindsight coincides in many respects with the system of "physiological psychology" formulated by Descartes, 23 there is another percipience that is "active and moral which is nothing other than the faculty of attaching our affections to beings who are foreign to us." 24 This type of sensitivity, which cannot be reduced to the simple form of an organic structure or bodily mechanism, is governed by laws similar to those of magnetism. It is at this level, that of sentiment and not mere sensation, that the normative value of emotion must be sought:
The positive or attracting action is the simple work of nature, which seeks to extend and reinforce the feeling of our being; the negative or repelling action, which compresses and diminishes the being of another, is a combination produced by reflection. From the former arise all the loving and gentle passions, and from the latter all the hateful and cruel passions.
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This identification of the category of sentiment as the autonomous principle of emotions is in fact what allowed Rousseau to detach them from mere physical necessity, to the point of regarding them as a determinant of the moral conduct of man. Rousseau openly overturns the Cartesian -and, more generally, the Stoic -perspective, according to which strength of spirit is best expressed by overcoming passions and arresting the movements of the body that accompany them. In order to explain the dynamic that directs the passions towards either goodness or evil, which per se is irreducible to the study of the workings of every single affection, Rousseau introduced, in the Dialogues, a further distinction within active and moral sensitivity (or sentiment). Alongside a "positive sensitivity" which "is directly derived from the love of the self" and "is a pure matter of feeling which is directly derived from the love of oneself" he placed a "negative sensitivity" that is the direct expression of the degeneration of amour de soi that is amour-propre:
As soon as one adopts the habit of measuring oneself against others and moving outside oneself in order to assign oneself the first and best place, it is impossible not to develop an aversion for […] everything that by being something prevents us from being everything.
26
It is therefore evident that sensitivity, understood in its moral sense, needs to be addressed and it is equally evident that only emotion can carry out this task. The real crux of the problem of Rousseau's theory of the passions thus appears to reside in what might be considered the "asymmetry" between his explanation of the negative and positive extremes of moral sensitivity. From the Discours sur l'inégalité onwards, Rousseau clearly understood the idea that the degradation of the passions and any negative manifestation of them can be imputed exclusively to amour-propre, a "relative sentiment, artificial and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do to one another." 27 However, it is hard to understand what constitutes the "positive sensitivity" that draws other passions towards virtue and in which the ethical value of emotion resides. The explanation that at first glance might appear most obvious, namely its identification with amour de soi, is plainly inadequate. Apart from a few isolated passages in Rousseau's texts, which occasionally appear to offer a de facto justification for a misunderstanding of this sort, it is undeniable that the love of self cannot de jure have any authentically moral function, as is made very clear in the Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont: "The only passion born with man, namely love of the self, is a passion in itself indifferent to good and evil; that it becomes good or bad only by accident." 28 A similar argument applies for physical pleasure and pain, whose power of attraction or repulsion is pivotal to the level of mere sensation, but is notably diminished in relation to any moral and emotional dimension.
In the end, then, it is necessary to assume the existence of a sort of positive equivalent of amour-propre that is entirely moral and social and able to counteract -from the sociological perspective that distinguished Rousseau's vision of emotional life -its negativity. I propose to identify this force with attendrissement, which can be considered the key transitional state in Rousseau's effort to preserve the inherent goodness of man, thanks to its capacity of retaining the principles of the law of nature while elevating them to an ethically superior dimension. 
Attendrissement and pity
Precisely because it is an emotion that guides other emotions, it is extremely difficult to find an unequivocal definition of tenderness in the work of Rousseau. The concept of attendrissement in its various forms (attendrir, attendri, attendrissant, s'attendrir, tendresse) is in almost all cases "complementary" to other passions. At times it is applied to admiration, joy and gratitude, but also to anxiety or to shame. 29 What these seemingly disparate usages have in common is sentimental empathy with others. Tenderness can in fact be considered, in its most general sense, as the "imagination of the heart" 30 which consists of the ability to "feel himself in his fellows."
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Thus the close tie between attendrissement and pity, the "natural virtue" that excites "a natural repugnance to see any other sensitive Being perish or suffer, principally those like ourselves," becomes clear.
32 There is a relationship of dependency and "derivation" between pity and tenderness that should not, however, be confused with identification. Pity is in fact instinctual and anterior to reason and therefore belongs to a pre-emotional dimension, whereas tenderness is the expression par excellence of the morality of the emotional life, to such an extent that, in the eighth book of the Confessions, Rousseau defined it as "that lively and sweet emotion that I feel at the sight of all that is virtuous, generous, lovable."
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The qualitative difference between pitié and attendrissement was already present, albeit in nuce, in the Discours sur l'inégalité. There Rousseau used all his rhetorical skills to demonstrate how human beings and animals are both subject to natural law, while still preserving the specific human quality of being able to choose between following or challenging instinct. Whereas all animals exhibit a form of pity that can be considered "passive,"
34 exemplified by the "repugnance of Horses to trample a living Body underfoot,"
35 only human beings seem to experience an active element that irrepressibly urges them to act regardless of any other motive, including the instinct of self-preservation. This uniqueness is illustrated by a famous example taken from the work of Mandeville, who described: the pathetic image of an imprisoned man who sees outside a wild Beast tearing a Child from his Mother's breast, breaking his weak limbs in its murderous teeth, and ripping apart with its claws the palpitating entrails of this Child. What horrible agitation must be felt by this witness of an event in which he takes no personal interest! This example, however, is not a little problematic. Indeed, while Rousseau claimed to see in this story what "the pure movement of Nature prior to all reflection," 37 it is quite clear that in reality it describes an entirely emotional state in which, of his own free will, the individual is able to choose a purely moral and sentimental motive over self-interest. In this specific case, the powerless spectator will not hesitate to be torn to pieces by a wild beast in an effort to save the child.
This undefined sympathetic sentiment that can preserve its original naturalness is openly identified with the attendrissement in the fourth book of Émile, a work that provides a clearer grasp of the relationship between pitié and attendrissement. It elaborates the genealogical dimension of pity already present, as observed by Victor Gourevitch, in the second Discourse: "By speaking about self-preservation and pity as 'principles,' Rousseau is calling attention to the fact that they manifest themselves in different forms at different stages of the development of individuals and of the species." 38 In the treatise on education, pity was in fact no longer presented primarily as an instinctual and premoral factor, but rather as the "the first relative sentiment which touches the human heart according to the order of nature." 39 This form of pity is inactive (or undeveloped) during childhood and manifests itself during the "stormy revolution" of puberty, which also marks the first authentic moral recognition of otherness:
But when the first development of his [the adolescent] senses lights the fire of imagination, he begins to feel himself in his fellows, to be moved by their complaints and to suffer from their pains. It is then that the sad picture of suffering humanity ought to bring to his heart the first tenderness it has ever experienced […] . In fact, how do we let ourselves be moved by pity if not by transporting ourselves outside of ourselves and identifying with the suffering animal by leaving, as it were, our own being to take on its being? 40 What makes this "actualization" of pity, this call towards an ethically superior level, possible is in actual fact tenderness. It signals the "second birth" of the individual, who through it encounters his "real" existence, moral and social. In the Nouvelle Héloïse, Claire observes the inability of children to be moved emotionally -"My children move me and know not how to be moved" 41 -and Rousseau himself imputed part of his failure as a tutor of Mably's children to his futile attempt to make them feel an emotion from which they were naturally precluded: "Sometimes with Ste. Marie I became softened to the point of crying; I wanted to soften him as if childhood were susceptible to a genuine emotion of the heart." 42 Thus attendrissement, as is repeatedly stressed in Émile, coincides with the individual's moment of ingress into his humanity, to the extent that anyone who is incapable of such a feeling must be a monster: "The man who did not know […] tenderness of humanity […] would be moved by nothing. He would not be sociable; he would be a monster among his kind." 43 Another text that made a decisive contribution to clarifying the difference between simple instinctual pity -which is entirely passive -and tenderness -which by contrast leads immediately to a positive morality -was the Essai sur l'origine des langues, written at the same time as his treatise on education. In this work, Rousseau does not argue for the existence of pity as an anthropological principle (as in the second Discours), nor does he place pity within a "genealogical" vision of the development of human faculties (as in Émile), but rather he analyzes it as a subjective process. In other words, he describes the instances and the conditions from which it manifests itself in the one who experiences it: "How do we let ourselves be moved to pity? By transporting ourselves outside of ourselves; by identifying ourselves with the suffering being. We suffer only as much as we judge he suffers." 44 The qualitative difference between this form of pity and that described in the Discours sur l'inégalité is clear. While the latter is only a form of emotive proximity that involves extending one's concern for one's self-preservation to the other, the former is an emotional identification which makes it possible to access the suffering of others directly: "It is not in ourselves, it is in him that we suffer." 45 The shift between these two forms of pity coincides with the spread of tenderness. In fact, tenderness is not so much a simple sensitivity to the pain of others (characteristic of the "passive pity" shared between human beings and animals) that marks the essential difference between childhood and moral maturity, so much as a complex and composite emotion which impels individuals to recognize themselves in others and in the common humanity that binds them together.
In light of these reflections, it can be argued that attendrissement maintains a sort of two-way relationship with pitié. On the one hand, it descends directly from the instinctual component of "passive pity" but, on the other, it becomes the indispensable prerequisite for the manifestation of a fully active and moral pity that is unique to human beings. In other words, attendrissement makes possible the development of the whole emotional dynamic and a gradual refinement of the naturally virtuous mouvements that typifies the human condition.
Attendrissement and authenticity
The mediating and "propulsive" role that attendrissement fulfills in Rousseau's emotional dynamics helps explain the central ethical function accorded to it. Rousseau's basic insight seems to lie in the fact that tenderness (and, more generally, emotion) can be considered a source of normativity thanks to its ability to be authentic, in other words involuntary and spontaneous. 46 Tenderness is characterized primarily by a high component of non-intentionality, as was effectively underlined by Saint-Preux in a letter to Milord Edouard in which he defined it as "to be overcome little by little with emotion without knowing why." 47 This peculiarity is typical of any expression of emotional life: because of the inseparable link between active and passive sensitivity, all "movements" of the passions produce uncontrollable reactions and visible effects on the physical plane. They affect the circulation of blood, which transmits the agitation to the eyes, the voice, the face or the body as a whole: "Those [the passions] of ardent and sensitive hearts are the work of nature, they show themselves despite the person who has them. Their initial, purely mechanical explosion is independent of his will." 48 Tears are undoubtedly a unique form of the manifestation of attendrissement: "Tenderness and tears accompany the sweetest enjoyments." 49 This association is referred to in many passages of the Confessions and is confirmed by Rousseau's description of Jean-Jacques's moral temperament in the second Dialogue:
If he is moved in the slightest, his eyes promptly fill with tears. Yet pain alone never made him shed a tear. But any tender and sweet or great and noble feeling the truth of which reaches his heart inevitably draws tears from him. He can weep only out of compassion. 50 The spontaneity of tenderness thus resides, in the final analysis, in its ability to establish a transparent and immediate relationship between interiority and exteriority, revealing the truth of the former through the latter. This way of displaying emotion, which is beyond the control of the subject and finally overwhelms him, has absolutely nothing to do with its objectivization, but if anything "possesses the ambiguous and almost contradictory character of an epiphany […] . Interiority is not separated from its origins when it reveals itself." 51 Precisely because it is entirely unexpected and can be neither desired nor manipulated, attendrissement is able to truly put individuals in contact with their neighbors, culminating in -as pointed out in the Préface to the Nouvelle Héloïse -to a perfect sharing of inner life: "And yet one feels the soul melt; one feels moved without knowing why. The strength of the sentiment may not strike us, but its truth affects us, and that is how one heart can speak to another." 52 In perfect harmony with this programmatic declaration, the entire epistolary novel, constructed through a refined polyphony of voices, can be regarded as an attempt to investigate the many facets that attendrissement assumes in the establishment of interpersonal relationships. This fictional depiction allows Rousseau to adopt a line of argument that is the opposite of and complementary to the second Discourse. If, in that case, the hypothetical reconstruction of the process of degeneration had highlighted the historical prevalence of amour-propre and its negative sensitivity, the utopian dimension of the Nouvelle Héloïse makes possible the triumph of the positive sensitivity of tenderness. This objective, which has historically been ignored, would become accessible to mankind only after a dual "reform" of the individual and of society described in Émile and the Contract social. Both these aspects are anticipated in the Nouvelle Héloïse, which brings forth, on the one hand, the anthropological model of the âme sensible and, on the other, the exceptional community of Clarens, which is founded -as Nancy Yousef has demonstrated -on a meticulous "social" construction of emotivity: "Rousseau […] indulge[d] a fantasy about expunging the unknowable in others by imagining them to be self-evidently the same, absolutely exposed and therefore fully predictable." 53 All the social bonds of Clarens are in fact based on a communion of hearts, that is on the highly sympathetic sentiment of tenderness. This element of sharing emerges most clearly in the description of the tender friendship between Julie and Claire, which leads to a perfect symmetry between physical "proximity" and emotional empathy:
Ye gods! what a ravishing spectacle or rather what ecstasy, to behold two such moving Beauties tenderly embracing, the one's face resting on the other's breast, their sweet tears flowing together, and bathing that charming breast as dew from Heaven moistens the freshly bloomed lily!
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The same reciprocal feelings can be seen in other displays of tenderness, which help to establish and direct the moral bonds between the two. While Claire reminds her cousin of the sympathetic essence of attendrissement -"Do you not read in my compassionate heart the pleasure of sharing your pains and weeping with you?" 55 -it is Saint-Preux more than any other who experiences its power. The amour-passion that binds him to Julie is not fueled by the desire for physical and external possession but rather by the complete sharing of their inner lives made possible by tenderness: "[…] my heart melts with delight at the inexhaustible goodness of yours; […] there, I shared your emotion." 56 Julie, who "finds in all creation nothing but causes for compassion," 57 is also inevitably sensitive to the force of emotion, in particular as regards her relationship with her parents. The dramatic description of the illness and death of Julie's mother in particular, is emblematic:
I saw no one enter my aunt's room in the final days who was not moved to tears by the most moving of all sights. We could see the effort both of these hearts were making to draw closer to each other at the moment of a fatal separation.
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The morally contagious force of tenderness, 59 which emerges so clearly in these examples, is also illustrated most effectively by the tale of Fanchon Regard and Claude Anet, a short love story with a happy ending set in the first part of the novel. 60 Fanchon, a young motherless servant of the Étange family forced to take care of her seriously ill father, is burdened by large debts that she cannot pay. Her fiancé, Claude Anet, therefore decides to enlist in the army for three years in order to be able to help, even though it means being separated from her. The intervention of Julie and SaintPreux, moved by the plight of the unfortunate lovers, resolves the situation and enables Fanchon to reestablish the rights, too often trampled, of emotion. This is a clear example of attendrissement's ability to lead to an active form of pity capable of being translated into a moral volition:
Tell me, could you fail to be moved by the filial piety of my Fanchon, by her honest sentiments, her innocent simplicity? Are you not moved by the rare tenderness of that lover who sells himself to relieve his mistress? Will you not be only too happy to help bring about such a well-suited union? Ah if you and I lacked pity for united hearts that are being divided, from whom could they ever expect it?
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The tenderness of Julie is thus extended to everyone around her, to the point of becoming -as Jean Starobinski has noted -the political adhesive of Clarens: "The small self-contained community is centered around Julie, whose soul communicates to all around her." 62 The exceptional power of attendrissement is described with great insight by the wise Claire in a letter to her cousin:
Have you never observed, my Angel, to what degree anyone who comes near you clings to you? For a father and mother to cherish their only daughter is not, I know, much to marvel at […] ; but for a man as cold as Monsieur de Wolmar in the fullness of age to be stirred for the first time in his life upon seeing you; for a whole family to idolise you with one mind; […] for friends, acquaintances, domestics, neighbours, and a whole town to worship you all together and take the tenderest interest in you: that, my dear, is a less likely concurrence, one that would not take place unless there were some particular cause in your person. And do you know what that cause can be? It is […] that tender soul […] that makes you loved. 63 The complex dynamic between the inner and outer life immortalized in the pages of the Nouvelle Héloïse, which reveals how withdrawal into intimacy and personal fulfillment cannot be separated from an expansive movement towards others, can ultimately be considered the most profound expression of the genuineness that typifies tenderness. Just as it leads to self-recognition through gratitude towards others and through an awareness of common humanity, attendrissement must be regarded as the positive counterpart of amour-propre, capable of saving the moral value of emotion from the disrepute into which the prevalence (historical but not constitutive) of the degeneration of self-love would seem to mire it irredeemably.
Attendrissement and recognition
The essence of self-love, as the description of human degeneration outlined in the Discours sur l'inégalité demonstrates, is its tendency to lead people towards a false type of recognition which, by making self-identity depend entirely on the opinion of others, introduces an unbridgeable gap between the inner and outer life, stimulating the creation of a false, insincere and inauthentic emotional state. Beginning with the invention of metallurgy and agriculture, there crept into human beings, hitherto self-sufficient, an idea of dependence that originated from the need to possess, or pretend to possess, qualities that can attract public attention: "For one's own advantage, it was necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact was." 64 This process of dépossession of personal identity, which coincides with self-alienation, 65 is described astutely by Saint-Preux in the letters telling Julie of his stay in Paris, symbol par excellence of dénaturation. The convenience of the fictional form thus allows Rousseau to contrast so clearly two different "models" of emotion: the emotion of amourpropre, which developed historically and is represented by Paris, and the emotion of tenderness, which is realized in the (utopian but not impossible) community of Clarens. While the society of Julie and Wolmar, as we have seen, is founded on the honest sharing of inner feelings, in Paris social competition prevails. This competition is felt with such force as to oblige all individuals to settle on well established and commonly accepted forms of self-representation, to the point of transforming them into a veritable gallery of masks without distinguishing features: "All those people go out every evening to learn in their assemblies what they will think the next day." 66 Even the young tutor, despite his extremely sensitive nature, experiences all the alienating force of amour-propre: "None of [the objects] that strike me engages my heart, but taken together they disturb and suspend its affections, so much that I forget what I am and to whom I belong." 67 The reification of empty and external relationships ends, by a reverse procedure with respect to the manifestation of attendrissement, with the transforming of outer life into inner life, completely erasing true emotion, which is suffocated by the universal triumph of paraître: "Since all is but vain appearance and everything changes at every moment, I have no time to be moved by anything." 68 In this first process there is also a counterpoint to the dramatic rise of falsified emotion, which initially forces the protagonist of the Nouvelle Héloïse to disregard his feelings, thereby somehow denying his own humanity: "Thus forced to change the order of my moral affections, forced to attribute a value to fantasies, and impose silence on nature and reason, thus I see disfigured that divine model I bear within me." 69 Amour-propre thus changes interpersonal and emotional relations between individuals into what might be considered a zero-sum game in which the success or failure of one player is perfectly balanced by the failure or success of another. Seen in this way, anyone wishing to reclaim their identity can do so only in competition with the other, acquiring social power to the other's detriment and earning himself marks of distinction, such as honor or wealth. Furthermore, and as a logical consequence of this battle for social recognition, there is a subversion of the naturally good "movements" of the passions and a consequent obfuscation of the transparent link between physical and moral sensitivity. This process is described also in the Dialogues, through the opposition between the normative model of "Jean-Jacques" and the "homme du monde," product of historical degeneration: "In the class of common men, without the counterweight of sensibility, amour-propre will always tip the scales, and if they do not remain nothing, it will make them wicked." 70 A similar observation appears to introduce a seemingly insurmountable difficulty with regard to investing any normative value in the emotional sphere: the impossibility of eliminating amour-propre. Without wishing to embrace the distorted image of a primitivist Rousseau, it is in fact implausible to imagine uprooting this sentiment from the human soul, since the intersubjective foundation that underlies it marks the individual's access to the emotional sphere and, as a corollary, also to morality. Thus this is seen to be not only an unattainable goal but also an undesirable course of action, since the disappearance of self-love would irreparably undermine the ability of human beings to engage in any authentically social action, being left in empty solipsism.
In this way, the asymmetry between amour de soi and amour-propre emerges in full force, having apparently originated from the continuous shift between the descriptive and prescriptive register that marks Rousseau's thought. If amour-propre can be considered in the same way as empirical evidence, which comes from direct observation of social relationships that of necessity distinguish the human condition, it appears ultimately to be a borderline condition for which to strive, suspended between historicalhypothetical reconstruction (as in the Discours sur l'inégalité) and personal myth (as in the Confessions or the Rêveries). Some interpreters, as for example Barbara Carnevali, have used similar premises to reread Rousseau's anthropology in a highly confrontational and competitive light, to the extent of advancing the hypothesis of an original nature of amour-propre, that was, however, misunderstood by Rousseau himself:
And if, instead of being an historical product, amour-propre was more original than amour de soi? If it was inseparable from the human condition? Can we really obtain a more "natural" I, which escapes the inauthenticity implicit in all relationships with others? 71 Such conclusions, in as much as they have the undoubted merit of allowing a crucial and problematic aspect of Rousseau's anthropology to emerge, seem to be clearly contradicted by his conception of attendrissement. It is this that enables us to identify a positive form of recognition, which not only fits coherently into the "sociological" theory of passions, but also permits us to retain the moral and normative value of emotion without having to resort to an interpretative hypothesis resting on the "unthought" or on unconscious mystifications of Rousseau's text.
As Frederick Neuhouser has persuasively demonstrated, the conformist and alienating nature of amour-propre is a result of a historical degeneration, accidental and unnecessary. It can ultimately be interpreted in the same way as a consideration to think about values: "In brief, amour-propre is good […] because its end is in fact highly valued by human beings and because it can be achieved in morally permissible ways." 72 Nothing prevents us from imagining a positive realization of amour-propre, non-pathological and not extreme. Nothing prevents us -as confirmed by the paradigmatic example of Clarensfrom imagining a form of recognition that, while obviously remaining comparative (this is a fundamental element of emotivity), is not competitive. As we have tried to highlight, this is exactly the mechanism at the heart of tenderness, which prompts the individual to recognize himself in his neighbor and with him rather than against him. If the fake emotion that derives from amour-propre consists simply in being ahead of others, in seeing them as external to ourselves, real emotion will induce us in that same moment to return to ourselves: "Self-knowledge is consequent to and does not precede the recognition of another." 73 In the first option, while mistakenly believing to have succeeded in establishing himself socially, the individual in fact renounces his humanity and, being unable to feel any surge of tenderness, can be compared to a lifeless body: "[He] who by dint of self-centeredness, succeeds in loving only himself, has no more transports. His icy heart no longer palpitates with joy; a sweet tenderness never moistens his eyes […] . He is already dead." 74 Conversely, by choosing the second approach, the sympathetic and unselfish nature of attendrissement makes it possible to truly recognize oneself in gratitude towards one's neighbor: "Nothing ties hearts together so much as the sweetness of weeping together." 75 This "sympathetic recognition, based on utter transparency" 76 appears to be the only possible solution to realizing that universal ethic of the moral individual which -according to the well-known interpretation of Tzvetan Todorov 77 -represents the most profound message in Rousseau's thought, the precursor of a true humanism based on a common ethic that does not lead to intolerance nor succumbs to relativism.
Conclusion
The originality of Rousseau's theory of the passions is to be found not only in the awareness that the definition of emotion (and its naturalness) operates exclusively within culture, but above all in having explored -with an unprecedentedly profound scrutiny -the intrinsically moral nature of emotion. For this reason, in all of Rousseau's work, the discourse on emotion is transformed into the strategic articulation of a philosophical position: if it is true that emotion, degenerated into fictitious passion in the homme de l'homme, has negative undertones to the point of becoming an means of dominating one's neighbor, it is equally true that the same emotion -if properly developed and remaining faithful to natural goodness -can and must become the yardstick of human conduct, both in the individual and political spheres. We have sought to demonstrate that the key transitional moment towards this objective (undoubtedly difficult to attain and always precarious) is represented by attendrissement, an emotion that preserves its natural innocence while rising to the level of civil morality.
Thus it is tenderness that, in hindsight, saves emotionalism from the disrepute in which its historical degeneration (which gave rise to competitive passions, simulated passions, etc.) at first glance seems to have cast it. The most common criticism leveled at a philosophical theory that claims to identify the basis of a moral position in emotions consists of insinuating that emotion itself is circumstantial and conventional. 78 In the end this is always linked to a single occurrence on which it is impossible to erect a generalizable ethical model. In such a perspective emotion can aspire at most to a subordinate and provisional moral function as a surrogate, sensitive and biological, of reason. This objection fails, or at least loses a large part of its significance, within Rousseau's conception of sensitivity. By intertwining inextricably feeling and sentiment, and physiological organization and moral order, Rousseau can without contradiction make a case for the single occurrence of emotion (linked inevitably to passive sensitivity) and its universal validity (derived instead from the ambiguity of active and moral sensitivity, construed of course in a positive sense).
A careful analysis of attendrissement and its specific relationship to pity on the one hand and to amour-propre on the other, ultimately makes it possible to highlight the originality of Rousseau's description of emotional life, which represents a fundamental step in the birth process of the modern subject. Rousseau's highest ambition lies in the effort, not without tensions, of ensuring normative autonomy of the self, while conceiving the relationship between individuals in terms other than those of reciprocal exclusion, in perfect harmony with the belief, expressed by Julie, according to whom "a soul that is moved involves all of creation in its passion." On the distinction between love of self (amour de soi) and self-love (amour-propre) see Sakakura, "Essai sur l'amour-propre"; Dent and O'Hagan, "Rousseau on 'Amour-Propre'"; Vincenti, "Rousseau et l'amour de soi"; Audi, Une philosophie de l'âme, 376-81; and Brunet and Guillarme, "The Subject and its Body." 28. "L'unique passion qui naisse avec l'homme, savoir l'amour de soi, est une passion indifférente en elle-même au bien et au mal; qu'elle ne devient bonne ou mauvaise que par accident. vol. 3, 154; Collected Writings, vol. 3, 36. 36 . "La pathétique image d'un homme enfermé qui aperçoit au-dehors une bête féroce arrachant un enfant du sein de sa mère, brisant sous sa dent meurtrière les faibles membres, et déchirant de ses ongles les entrailles palpitantes de cet enfant. Quelle affreuse agitation n'éprouve point
